Chhattisgarh High Court Allows Husband to Represent Wife, Quashes Rejection of Mukhtyarnama

October 30, 2001 : The Chhattisgarh High Court has set aside a trial court order that refused to accept a mukhtyarnama and to allow a husband to represent his wife in an eviction suit. The appellate court found the lower court’s reasoning overly technical and inconsistent with the clear provisions of the Powers of Attorney Act and the Civil Procedure Code.

The facts are straightforward. A woman filed an eviction suit and sought to place a mukhtyarnama on record that authorised her husband to act for her. She also applied under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, asking that her husband be permitted to appear, plead and act on her behalf, explaining that she is parda nashin and generally unwell. The defendant objected, arguing that she was neither parda nashin nor sick.

The trial judge rejected the application for two main reasons. First, because the mukhtyarnama contained the plaintiff’s photograph, the judge concluded she could not be a parda nashin woman. Second, the trial court said no medical evidence of sickness had been produced and therefore refused to accept the mukhtyarnama and to permit the husband to act.

On appeal, the High Court disagreed. The court reminded the lower forum that Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act permits a donee to execute instruments or do acts in his own name and signature by authority of the donor, and that such acts are legally equivalent to those done by the donor. The court also pointed to Order 3 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which recognises persons holding a power of attorney as authorised agents who may make appearances and take other steps on behalf of parties.

The High Court held that the trial court took an unnecessarily technical approach. Affixing a photograph to a mukhtyarnama, the bench noted, is often required to validate the instrument and does not, by itself, prove that the donor is not parda nashin. Likewise, the court said, the fact that the donor had filed the suit personally should not, without more, be taken as a bar to subsequently appointing a power of attorney. Practical realities of modern life and commerce, the court said, justify a common sense approach rather than hyper-technical readings that frustrate statutory intent and cause needless hardship.

The High Court also relied on earlier authority that reached the same legal conclusion: actions taken by a holder of a power of attorney are to be treated as acts of the donor. Applying that principle here, the appellate court found the impugned order to be legally unsustainable and vitiated by jurisdictional error.

Accordingly, the High Court set aside the trial court’s order dated 6 February 2001. The bench observed that any delay in the trial caused by the impugned order was a consequence of that error. It directed that, once a copy of the High Court’s order is produced, the trial court should proceed to decide the eviction suit expeditiously, preferably within four months.

This ruling reinforces two practical points for litigants and lower courts. First, courts should give full effect to properly executed powers of attorney, and should avoid refusing recognition for technical or formal reasons where statute and precedent support recognition. Second, parties who appoint agents by mukhtyarnama or power of attorney can rely on the statutory effect given to those instruments, including the authority they confer for litigation-related acts.

Case Details : Civil Revision No. 225 and 2001, Shail Devi Saraf vs. Janakibai Gupta

Counsels: For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Shrikumar Agrawal, Adv. For Respondents/Defendant: H.S. Tripathi, Adv.