Chhattisgarh HC upholds the DPC’s 15-mark benchmark for Additional SP posting, ruling that eligibility does not guarantee posting.

News Citation : 2026 LN (HC) 434

The Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur has dismissed a writ petition challenging the Departmental Promotion Committee’s decision to declare a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DySP) unfit for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police (Addl. SP) after she secured 14 marks against the committee’s prescribed minimum benchmark of 15 marks. In its order delivered on August 25, 2026, in Madhuri Dhirhi v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., WPS No. 4177 of 2026, the Court held that an officer may have a right to be considered for such posting but does not acquire an automatic or vested right to appointment or posting. The Court further held that the DPC has the discretion to prescribe a reasonable minimum benchmark for assessing suitability, provided the standard is applied uniformly and is not arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or contrary to the governing service rules.

Justice Bibhu Datta Guru passed the order after hearing a petition filed by Madhuri Dhirhi, a 2014-batch directly recruited Deputy Superintendent of Police who was serving in the Senior Scale. According to the petitioner, she had completed the required eight years of qualifying service and therefore fulfilled the eligibility conditions under Rule 23 read with Column (4) of Schedule-V of the Chhattisgarh Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005. Her grievance arose from the DPC’s consideration for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police in December 2025, when she was declared “not fit” because she had secured 14 marks against the committee’s minimum benchmark of 15 marks.

The petitioner argued before the High Court that the 15-mark benchmark had no basis in the 2005 Rules. Her service record contained four “Very Good” and one “Good” grading. Under the grading system relied upon by her, “Very Good” carried three marks per year while “Good” carried two marks, resulting in a total of 14 marks. Her counsel contended that fixing 15 marks as the minimum effectively required an officer to have the equivalent of “Very Good” grading for all five years. It was argued that the DPC had thereby introduced an additional and arbitrary criterion that was not prescribed by the applicable statutory rules.

The petitioner also relied on a circular issued by the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh Government on September 5, 1974, which, according to her case, prescribed a benchmark ranging from 8 to 12 marks for a “Good” assessment. The Court was also informed that in earlier years, from 2014 to 2017, the DPC had prescribed a minimum benchmark of 10 marks. On this basis, the petitioner alleged that the subsequent fixation of 15 marks was contrary to the applicable framework and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before law and equality of opportunity in public employment.

The State opposed the petition, arguing that the petitioner had no vested right to be posted as Additional Superintendent of Police and possessed only a right to have her case considered. The government submitted that the DPC was an expert body competent to assess the suitability of officers on the basis of their service records and Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). It maintained that the 15-mark benchmark had been adopted in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003 and prevailing practice, and that the DPC had applied the same standard uniformly to all eligible officers.

The High Court had earlier directed the Additional Director General of Police (Administration) to file an affidavit explaining how the 15-mark benchmark had been fixed for considering DySPs for posting as Additional SPs. In response, the State informed the Court that the duly constituted DPC had considered the nature, responsibilities and requirements of the higher post, along with the service records and ACRs of eligible officers. According to the affidavit, the committee determined 15 marks as the minimum standard required for satisfactory performance at the higher level and applied the benchmark uniformly to all eligible officers.

The Court examined Rule 23 of the 2005 Rules, which provides that members of the service working in the Senior Scale, Selection Grade or Senior Selection Grade and fulfilling the eligibility conditions specified in Schedule-V are eligible for consideration for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police, Deputy Commandant or an equivalent rank. The rule further provides that selection for such posting is to be made by the committee specified in Schedule-V. Justice Guru observed that the provision gives an eligible officer a right of consideration, but it does not create a vested or indefeasible right to secure the posting itself.

A significant part of the judgment concerns the scope of judicial review over decisions taken by a DPC. The High Court emphasized that a court does not ordinarily sit as an appellate authority over an expert committee’s assessment of an officer’s suitability. The Court observed that the DPC is entitled to undertake an overall assessment of service records and ACRs and may apply uniform and objective standards while determining whether an officer meets the required level of suitability.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Union of India v. A.K. Narula, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 10, the High Court noted that a DPC has a degree of flexibility in assessing candidates and may make its own overall assessment rather than being mechanically bound by the overall grading recorded in confidential reports. The Supreme Court had made it clear that judicial interference is warranted where the assessment process is affected by bias, mala fides or arbitrariness, but not where the committee has acted fairly and applied the same standards to all candidates.

The High Court also relied on B.V. Sivaiah & Ors. v. K. Addanki Babu & Ors., reported in (1998) 6 SCC 720, in which the Supreme Court recognized that, under the principle of “seniority-cum-merit”, the competent authority may prescribe the minimum standard necessary for administrative efficiency and may determine the mode of assessing merit, including by assigning marks on the basis of service records and prescribing minimum qualifying marks.

The Court further referred to Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 305, to underline that courts should not substitute their own assessment for that of a duly constituted expert selection committee. Interference may be justified in limited circumstances such as illegality, patent material irregularity in the constitution or procedure of the committee, or proved mala fides affecting the selection process.

Applying these principles, the High Court found that the DPC had specifically recorded the requirement that the minimum standard for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police should be “Good” with a minimum of 15 marks. The committee then assessed the petitioner’s service record and found that she had obtained 14 marks. The Court held that the mere fact that the petitioner’s calculation of marks from her individual ACR gradings resulted in 14 marks did not establish that the DPC’s benchmark was arbitrary. The crucial question was whether the committee had the authority to prescribe a minimum standard and whether that standard had been applied uniformly and consistently with the governing rules.

The Court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the 15-mark benchmark had been applied selectively, that similarly situated officers had been treated differently, or that the DPC’s decision was motivated by mala fides, bias or arbitrariness. The judgment therefore draws an important distinction between eligibility and suitability. Meeting the statutory eligibility requirements allows an officer to enter the zone of consideration, but it does not guarantee that the officer will be found suitable for the higher post.

“Eligibility for consideration is distinct from suitability for posting,” the Court held while upholding the DPC’s assessment. It further concluded that the DPC was competent to prescribe a reasonable minimum benchmark for assessing suitability and that no sufficient ground had been established for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed WPS No. 4177 of 2026, holding that the petition was devoid of merit. The ruling reinforces the limited scope of judicial review in matters involving departmental promotion and posting assessments. While government departments and DPCs must comply with statutory rules and constitutional standards of fairness, an expert committee can prescribe objective minimum standards for determining suitability when such standards are applied uniformly and do not suffer from arbitrariness, discrimination or mala fide exercise of power.

The decision is significant for officers seeking posting or promotion to higher responsibilities within the police service because it clarifies that completing the required qualifying service does not by itself establish a right to the higher post. At the same time, the judgment does not give DPCs unrestricted power. Their assessment remains subject to the governing service rules and judicial review where the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, biased, mala fide or otherwise legally impermissible.